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SUMMARY
Alberta’s new royalty regime has made the province a more rewarding place 
for anyone looking to invest in conventional non-renewable resources. After 
Alberta’s NDP government commissioned a review of the royalty regime to 
ensure the province was receiving its “fair share,” it ended up determining that 
revenue-neutral changes were warranted to the royalty system for conventional 
oil, with oilsands largely left untouched. However, the few changes that were 
made have had a substantial impact on incentives for new investment. Those 
changes have, in fact, only made it more lucrative for investors in Alberta’s 
conventional oil and gas.
This paper focuses on oil and the fiscal regime (it does not consider other 
regulatory and carbon policies that affect competitiveness). The changes for 
conventional oil are significant enough that the new regime entirely overcomes 
the competitive disadvantages for non-oil sands producers created by the NDP 
government’s increase in provincial corporate income taxes last year.
Under the current regime, Alberta conventional oil bears a marginal effective 
tax and royalty rate (METRR) of 35.0 per cent (the METRR is relevant for new 
investment decisions). The changes have sharply reduced that to 26.7 per cent. 
This year, when compared against its peers in the U.S., Europe and Australia, 
Alberta has one of the highest METRRs for conventional oil. When the new royalty 
regime takes fully effect in 2017, it will have one of the lowest, bested only by 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Pennsylvania and, in Canada, Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland & Labrador. Most notably, Alberta is more competitive now than 
its immediate neighbours, British Columbia and Saskatchewan, for conventional 
oil investment. It is also less distorting across different types of wells, which is an 
important quality in a well-designed royalty system.
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Alberta continues to implement a system of price-sensitive royalty rates with the 
government’s take increasing with the oil price. Our results are derived using a certain 
projected oil price and a certain projected exchange rate — in this case US$50 per 
barrel of West Texas Intermediate and 77 U.S. cents per dollar — with changes to either 
potentially altering the rankings and making Alberta more or less competitive, depending 
on what happens with those two variables. Under the new regime, Alberta’s tax burden on 
conventional oil projects is reduced for a wide range of oil prices. Whether the Province 
will attract investment for conventional oil once the market conditions improve will 
depend as well on other policies being adopted but at least the new royalty regime will 
help boost interest in the Province.
1With the Alberta government having completed its review of its royalty regime, the degree to which 
its fiscal regime discourages or attracts investment relative to other options for oil investments 
remains of significant interest to the public. Certainly, with low global oil prices, investment is 
being severely cut back around the world at this time. However, interest in petroleum investments 
will improve globally when prices firm up, so Alberta’s fiscal regime will be a critical element in 
determining how much new investment the province attracts. This report specifically examines 
corporate taxes and royalties although competitiveness can also be affected by regulations and 
carbon policies that are not subjects of this analysis.
Looking at the fiscal impacts on new investment, we show below that Alberta’s previous fiscal 
regime prior to the recent reform was not particularly competitive in attracting investment relative 
to some jurisdictions, but neither was it badly out of line with other jurisdictions considered in 
this study, a result consistent with the conclusions of the province’s own royalty review.1 However, 
the new Alberta royalty regime improves sharply the competitiveness of the fiscal regime for 
conventional petroleum (the oilsands royalty regime changed little), overcoming the increase in the 
provincial corporate income tax rates in 2015. Alberta’s fiscal regime is still less competitive when 
compared to Australia’s, the United Kingdom’s and the Atlantic offshore regimes, but it is more 
attractive than regimes in the United States (except in Pennsylvania), Saskatchewan and, to a lesser 
degree, British Columbia. 
We also find that the new royalty regime in Newfoundland & Labrador reduces distortions while 
maintaining competitiveness with most royalty regimes. 
Much of the concern over royalty design has focused on “fair” share. However, a well-designed 
royalty system would follow three general principles:
• As owner of the resource, the province is entitled to a significant share of rents.
• To attract the best producers, the province should design a royalty system that provides 
stability and a competitive rate of return consistent with other jurisdictions. This implies that 
the ablest producers will receive some share of rents.2
• The royalty should distort investment decisions as little as possible in order to maximize 
rents earned on projects. 
Our analysis, focusing on investment effects, does not provide guidance as to whether Alberta 
collects its “fair” share of rents (rents being the difference between revenues and all operating 
and capital costs incurred to produce oil). Recent work by Duanjie Chen shows that Alberta has 
historically collected roughly 50 per cent of rents through its royalty from conventional3 oil and gas 
production and more than 100 per cent of rents from oilsands production (many new investments 
have not reached maturity in generating profits yet and, given current oil prices, will take some 
1 
Canada. Government of Alberta, Alberta at a Crossroads, Royalty Review Panel Report (Edmonton, Alberta 2016).
2 
See Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002). The application of the principal-agent model to royalty design is discussed 
further in J. Mintz, “Taxes, resources and cross-border investments,” in International Taxation and Extractive Industries, 
ed. by P. Daniel, M. Keen, A. Swistak and V. Thuronyi, Routlege, forthcoming in 2016.
3 
In this paper we distinguish between oilsands (bitumen) and conventional production in Alberta. Conventional  
oil, including shale, is recoverable at a well from an underground reservoir and is liquid at atmospheric pressure  
and temperature. See Canada Government of Alberta website, “Conventional crude oil and oil sands,”  
http://www.albertacanada.com/business/industries/og-conventional-crude-oil-and-oil-sands.aspx. 
2time before new projects earn rents).4 Alberta also collects a share of rents through the corporate 
income tax and other levies on capital investments, such as property taxes.5 
The existing taxes and royalties do impose distortions on investments, impairing economic 
efficiency and therefore reducing rents earned by the government and producers. And even though 
the new Alberta royalty proposals will reduce distortions, they will not successfully achieve all the 
aims of optimal royalty design. 
In this short paper, we present an update looking at the impact of oil fiscal regimes in various 
jurisdictions on the incentive to invest in upstream oil projects. In 2012, The School of Public 
Policy published a comparative study6 of marginal effective tax and royalty rates for Canada, 
the United States and several other major oil producers around the world. Four years later, the 
market for oil has witnessed substantial changes, in particular the collapse of world oil prices 
since the second half of 2015. With some jurisdictions tying their royalties to the price of oil, and 
others amending their royalty rates and other tax policies, it would be interesting to know how 
the effective tax rates on oil and gas compare with competing countries and, in particular, where 
Canadian provinces stand today.
MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATES
The analysis below is based on a time-to-build model in which exploration and development 
expenditures are undertaken to prepare reserves for extraction. Conceptually, a business invests 
in capital (exploration, development and post-production capital) until the rate of return on 
incremental dollars is equal to the cost of capital (at this point, no further rents are earned). To 
measure the effect of taxes and royalties on investment decisions, the marginal effective tax and 
royalty rate (METRR) is calculated as the amount of taxes and royalties paid as a percentage of the 
pre-tax-and-royalty, net-of-risk return on capital that would be required to cover taxes, royalties, 
and the financing of capital with debt and equity.7
The advantage of this approach is that the variation in METRR across assets and industries 
provides a basis for analyzing capital distortions in fiscal systems. The higher the METRR, the 
lower investment will be, since the tax-adjusted cost of capital is higher, squeezing out marginal 
projects in an industry. Similarly, if one type of asset is favoured over others, companies will have 
an incentive to shift expenditures from one type or form to another and therefore impact on the 
technical choices made by firms in developing extractive projects. For example, fiscal systems 
typically provide incentives for exploration and development; it is not inconceivable that firms will 
push capital expenditure into the exploration or development phase that would have taken place 
post-production, thereby raising the overall cost of production. 
4 
Duanjie Chen, “Alberta Gets 51% in Royalties: Is that Fair?’ Financial Post, January 29, 2016.
5 
The new carbon tax in Alberta is not included in this analysis since it is a tax unrelated to capital investment (the carbon tax 
does raise the cost of production and consumer fuel prices). To analyze output-related taxes, a different analysis would be 
required that is inclusive of other taxes affecting all inputs used in production.
6 
J. Mintz and D. Chen, “Capturing Economic Rents from Resources through Royalties and Taxes,” University of Calgary, 
School of Public Policy Research Paper 30 (2012). We will not repeat the theoretical and methodological explanation 
provided in the earlier paper.
7 
Risk is incorporated in the analysis by measuring the risk-adjusted rate of return on capital. To the extent that the tax or 
royalty system shares risks with the producers by allowing for the refundability of losses, the government provides an 
implicit deduction for the cost of risk. This proposition is well-known in the economic literature, and it implies that the risk 
premium from capital-asset pricing models is reduced by the factor one minus the tax rate (see J. Mintz, “The Corporation 
Tax: A Survey,” Fiscal Studies 16, 4 (1996): 23-68).
3METHODOLOGY
With the exception of Alberta and Newfoundland & Labrador,8 the other jurisdictions considered 
here have either kept their tax treatment of the oil sector unchanged or have undertaken relatively 
minor changes in their royalty or corporate tax provisions. We therefore use the same theoretical 
model derived in the 2012 study, while updating the tax and non-tax parameters to current values. 
We have also remodelled Newfoundland & Labrador to take into account its new generic royalty 
regime, which is quite different than the previous regime.
We have updated the baseline oil price to US$50 per barrel to reflect the current market conditions 
and long-term expectations. We have also updated the operating cost per barrel of oil to US$10 
per barrel based on recent estimates by the Canadian Energy Research Institute.9 We also provide 
some sensitivity estimates for various oil price levels ranging from US$30 to US$70 (West Texas 
Intermediate) and for changes in operating cost of up to 20 per cent.
For all countries, we use updated inflation rates calculated as 10-year average (2004–2014) 
GDP-deflator inflation rates based on OECD data, which range from 1.20 per cent in the United 
Kingdom to 3.88 per cent in Norway. We have also updated the real interest rate and use the 
same rate of three per cent for all countries, which is in line with long-term average interest rates 
and a standard figure used in the economic literature. We have changed the time-to-build period 
for the development of oil projects from a two-year period to a more realistic six-year period 
(the expenditures made during the period are fixed per year, so the midpoint of development 
expenditures takes place three years before extraction begins).
In addition, we have updated for each country the tax and non-tax parameters affecting the 
marginal effective tax rates mainly based on information available in the Ernst and Young “Global 
Oil and Tax Guide 2015” and governmental websites. These changes are outlined below, alongside 
the main features of the tax treatment of oil and gas activities.
WHAT FISCAL CHANGES HAVE HAPPENED SINCE 2012?
Australia 
The Australian government has made no major changes in its fiscal treatment of oil and gas 
activities since 2012. Some changes that do not affect our model include the repealing of the carbon 
pricing legislation implementing the carbon pricing mechanism on July 17, 2014, as well as an 
extension of the petroleum resource rent tax (which previously applied to offshore projects only) to 
onshore projects and the North West Shelf project beginning July 1, 2012. The main elements of the 
Australian fiscal system for oil activities include: a corporate income tax of 30 per cent; royalties 
ranging from 10 to 12.5 per cent for onshore projects administered at state level; the petroleum 
resource rent tax (PRRT) of 40 per cent, deductible for income tax purposes and administered 
federally; as well as a system of capital allowance provisions and investment incentives. Under 
PRRT, expenditures that exceed revenues can be carried forward at an uplift rate ranging from the 
long-term bond rate plus five percentage points (for general expenditures), to the long-term bond 
8 
The government of Newfoundland & Labrador announced the introduction of a new, generic royalty system  
on Nov. 2, 2015 to replace bilateral negotiations with investors. Details can be found on the government website at:  
http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca/nr/royalties/generic_regime.html.
9 
Julie Dalzell, “Conventional Oil Supply Costs in Western Canada,” Canadian Energy Research Institute Study No. 135 
(Calgary, Alberta: CERI, June 2013).
4rate plus 15 percentage points (for exploration expenditures).10 The results included in this report 
reflect the offshore sector only.
Canada
Since 2012, the federal government has reduced some important tax incentives for the oil sector. 
These include the phasing out after 2016 of the accelerated depreciation allowance of up to 100 
per cent for new mine or mine-expansion assets (certain oil and gas projects are affected by this 
provision), and the phasing out of the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit fully by the end of 2015.11
There have also been some fiscal changes at the provincial level. 
• Alberta increased the corporate income tax rate from 10 to 12 per cent effective July 1, 2015. 
The royalty rates for both conventional oil and oilsands have decreased automatically due to 
the decrease in the price of oil. As discussed, Alberta has announced a new royalty regime 
slated for adoption in 2017, which is discussed in the next section.12
• British Columbia increased its corporate tax rate effective April 1, 2013 from 10 to 11 per 
cent. In 2013, British Columbia reinstated the retail sales tax after the Harmonized Sales 
Tax, implemented in 2010, was rejected by a referendum. This has a significant impact in the 
resource sector by increasing taxes on capital purchases.
• Saskatchewan made no change to its tax rates, but the royalty rate for oil has decreased as 
a result of the formula that is sensitive to the price of oil. The corporate income tax rate 
remains at 12 per cent.
• In Nova Scotia, there have been no specific changes outside of the changes to the federal 
Atlantic Investment Tax Credit as mentioned above. The corporate income tax rate is 16 per 
cent.
• Newfoundland & Labrador introduced a new, generic offshore-oil royalty regime in 
November 2015 based on the R-factor approach (revenue over accumulated cost index). The 
system includes a basic royalty rate ranging from one to 7.5 per cent applied to gross revenue 
as the project starts producing oil, increasing as the project recovers more of its costs. After 
costs have been recovered, a net royalty ranging from 10 per cent to 50 per cent will be 
applied to net revenue varying by the R-factor, and the basic royalty becomes a credit against 
net royalties. We have modelled these changes in the analysis below by assuming that the 
marginal investment reaches the maximum profitability (R-factor above three) so that the 
effective royalty rate is 50 per cent.13 In addition to the royalty change, Newfoundland & 
Labrador raised its corporate income tax rate from 14 to 15 per cent effective Jan. 1, 2016.
Norway 
Companies involved in extractive activities in Norway are subject to a corporate income tax of 
27 per cent, as well as a special tax or resource-rent tax in the offshore sector of 51 per cent (none 
10 
Deloitte, “Oil and Gas Taxation in Australia,” Deloitte Taxation and Investment Guides (2013),  
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-oilandgas-australia.pdf.
11 
The Atlantic Investment Tax Credit was equal to 10 per cent until 2013. It was decreased to five per cent in 2014 and 2015, 
and was completely eliminated in 2016.
12 
The Alberta government announced in July 2016 that companies can adopt the new regime early, in 2016, if they so desire.
13 
The intermediate case when the R-factor varies between one and three results in an incentive to expand the capital base to 
reduce the R-factor. This leads to a lower effective statutory tax rate that reduces the METRR calculated for investments. 
We are unable, however, to compute this case due to lack of data.
5for onshore). These rates represent a slight change from 2012 when the corporate income tax was 
28 per cent and the special tax was 50 per cent. Capital allowances for investment in facilities 
and installations are calculated on a straight-line basis over six years. For special purposes, an 
accelerated capital allowance is granted, which is spread over four years. Costs incurred before 
May 5, 2013 were subject to an annual uplift under the special tax of 7.5 per cent over a four-year 
period, which has been reduced to 5.5 per cent per year for expenditures incurred after May 4, 
2013.14 
The United Kingdom 
The U.K. has a fiscal regime for the oil and gas industry that includes a corporate income tax and a 
supplementary charge, as well as capital allowance provisions and various investment incentives.15 
A series of changes have been adopted since 2012. The corporate income tax for non-ring-fence 
projects was reduced from 21 to 20 per cent starting April 1, 2015. The corporate income tax rate 
is still 30 per cent for ring-fence projects (the rate we use in our analysis). The summer budget 
of 2015 proposed that the corporate income tax for all profits except ring-fence profits be further 
reduced to 19 per cent for taxation years starting April 1, 2017, and reduced again to 18 per cent 
starting April 1, 2020 (the corporate rate is to be further reduced to 17 per cent as announced by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer after the Brexit vote).16 The supplementary charge was reduced from 
32 to 20 per cent beginning Jan. 1, 2015, and then to 10 per cent in Budget 2016, backdated to Jan. 
1, 2016. Companies that incur a ring-fence loss in a period, which they cannot offset against other 
ring-fenced taxable profits, may claim the Ring-Fence Expenditure Supplement, which increases 
the ring-fence losses carried forward by 10 per cent per year for a maximum of 10 years (increased 
from six years prior to Dec. 5, 2013.) The Finance Act of 2014 introduced an allowance for onshore 
oil and gas projects, which reduces the profits of each qualifying project that is subject to the 
supplementary charge by an amount equal to 75 per cent of the capital expenditure incurred on that 
project on or after Dec. 5, 2013. The results included in this report reflect the offshore sector only.
The United States 
The United States applies a federal corporate income tax rate of 35 per cent, with a manufacturing 
deduction of six per cent that applies to the oil and gas sector, resulting in an effective corporate 
income tax rate of 32.9 per cent. Some states, but not all, levy a corporate income tax, which is 
deductible from the federal corporate income tax base. 
• Arkansas and Colorado have not adopted any significant changes to their fiscal regimes 
for oil and gas since 2012. Arkansas still applies a corporate income tax of 6.5 per cent,17 a 
royalty rate on oil extraction of one-eighth, or 12.5 per cent, and a severance tax of five per 
cent of the market value of oil (four per cent for wells producing less than 10 barrels per day). 
Colorado has a corporate income tax of 4.63 per cent, a royalty rate representing one-sixth of 
the gross sales value of oil or gas, and a severance tax of five per cent.18
14 
From “Oil and Gas Taxation in Norway,” Deloitte Taxation and Investment Guides (2014), 3, http://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-oil-and-gas-taxguide-norway.pdf.
15 
A petroleum revenue tax that applied to fields that received development consent prior to March 16, 1993 was reduced from 
50 to 35 per cent beginning Jan. 1, 2016, and then effectively eliminated in the 2016 budget. 
16 
From United Kingdom. HM Revenue and Customs website, “Guidance- rates and allowances: Corporate Tax,”  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax.
17 
For corporations with net taxable income exceeding US$100,000.
18 
Applied to the total net gross income in excess of US$299,999. 
6• North Dakota is now the second-largest oil producer in United States, after Texas, and a new 
addition to our METRR study. There are two oil-specific taxes in North Dakota: the oil gross 
production tax and the oil extraction tax. In 2015, the extraction tax provisions were reformed 
in order to reduce fluctuations in tax revenues associated with fluctuations in oil prices. In 
particular, an old provision was dropped that decreased the extraction tax rate to zero for 
most wells if the price of oil stayed under US$55 per barrel for more than five months.19 At 
the same time, the extraction tax rate has been reduced from 6.5 to five per cent beginning 
Jan. 1, 2016. However, the rate can increase to six per cent if the high-price trigger is in 
effect, i.e., if the average price of oil exceeds US$90 per barrel each month during a three-
month period. Besides the oil extraction tax, there is a production tax of five per cent applied 
to the gross value at the well of all oil produced.20 Overall, the maximum total tax rate is 10 
to 11 per cent. North Dakota also has a royalty rate on public land of 18.75 per cent and a 
corporate income tax rate of 4.31 per cent.21
• Pennsylvania currently has no severance tax, but is debating whether to introduce one.22 The 
corporate income tax is 9.99 per cent, the largest of all states considered. The royalty rate 
is one-eighth, or 12.5 per cent.23 In February 2012, Pennsylvania introduced an impact fee 
on shale gas producers, a flat annual fee increasing each year and collected for a period of 
15 years to compensate municipalities for the environmental impact of drilling activities. 
A corporate loan tax was eliminated in 2014, but corporations were still subject to a capital 
stock tax (for domestic firms) or foreign franchise tax (for foreign firms) at a rate of 0.45 mills 
of the corporation’s capital stock in 2015. These taxes have gradually been phased out since 
2012, and were completely eliminated for 2016.
• Texas applies a franchise or margins tax for the privilege of doing business in Texas. It has 
been reduced gradually from one per cent of a taxable entity’s margin to 0.975 per cent in 
2014, to 0.95 per cent in 2015, and is now permanently reduced to 0.75 per cent (as of 2016).24 
The royalty rate on public land is 25 per cent. Texas has a severance tax of 4.6 per cent on 
the market value of oil and condensate (the oil production tax), and 7.5 per cent on natural 
gas (the natural gas production tax). There is also an oilfield cleanup fee of 5/8 of a cent 
(US$0.00625) per barrel; this used to be supplemented by a regulatory fee of 3/16 of a cent 
(US$0.001875) per barrel, which was abolished starting on Sept. 1, 2015.
19 
Mark Peters, “North Dakota Overhauls Tax on Oil Producers,” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2015,  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-dakota-overhauls-tax-on-oil-producers-1430433385.
20 
United States. Government of North Dakota website, “Oil & Gas Severance Tax,” https://www.nd.gov/tax/oilgas/.
21 
Applied to taxable income exceeding US$50,000.
22 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf, a Democrat, proposed a severance tax on natural gas of five per cent plus a volumetric 
fee of 4.7 cents per thousand cubic feet in the summer of 2015. In a revised proposal, he later reduced the proposed 
severance tax to 3.5 per cent (plus the volumetric fee) due to difficulties in passing the budget through the Republican-
controlled legislature. The 2015–16 budget took nine months to pass and the severance tax was not adopted. A new rate 
of 6.5 per cent was proposed in Feb. 2016. See Reid Frazier, “Wolf tweaks gas tax plan; GOP, industry unimpressed,” 
StateImpact, October 16, 2015, https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2015/10/06/wolf-tweaks-gas-tax-plan-gop-industry-
unimpressed/; and Jamison Cocklin, “Pennsylvania Governor’s Severance Tax Proposal Could Set Highest Rate in Nation,” 
NGI’s Shale Daily, April 27, 2016, http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/106201-pennsylvania-governors-severance-tax-
proposal-could-set-highest-rate-in-nation.
23 
Section 1.9, added to the Pennsylvania’s Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act of 1979 on July 9, 2013, specifies that a lease 
contracts for oil and natural gas is only valid if the lessor is guaranteed at least one-eighth royalty of all oil or natural gas 
recovered.
24 
The tax base can be calculated in several ways: total revenue times 70 per cent; total revenue minus cost of goods sold; total 
revenue minus compensation; or total revenue minus US$1 million (see United States. Government of Texas, Comptroller of 
Public Accounts website, “Franchise Tax Overview,” http://comptroller.texas.gov/taxinfo/taxpubs/tx98_806.html.)
7ALBERTA’S ROYALTY REVIEW: IMPACT ON COMPETITIVENESS
The recent Alberta royalty review did not lead to significant changes to the oilsands royalty 
regime but it did result in a new royalty structure for conventional oil and gas. Under the current 
regime, the royalty rate for conventional oil increases with price and well productivity. With the 
new regime, the royalty rate on sales will remain price-sensitive but unrelated to volume until 
a threshold is reached (royalty rates decline when production drops below 194 cubic metres per 
month or approximately 40 barrels per day). A cost recovery allowance, sensitive to well depth but 
otherwise based on industry experience, will be provided instead of various drilling incentives. 
The new system includes a consolidation of royalty rates for fuel types produced from a well, 
as well as a five per cent minimum royalty on sales until the cost allowance is used up. The new 
post-payout royalty rate has been announced: After recovery of the cost allowance, the new royalty 
rates are below the older rates for a wide range of price levels as shown in Figure 1.25 Further, 
the government has also announced two new programs — the Enhanced Hydrocarbon Recovery 
Program and the Emerging Resources Program — that will provide an allowance for eligible costs 
with a corresponding royalty rate of five per cent. Once the cost allowance is used up, the new 
royalty rates will apply. 
FIGURE 1 NEW AND EXISTING ROYALTY RATES FOR CONVENTIONAL OIL IN ALBERTA
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We note that the cost allowance is independent of individual actions (it is based on industry-wide 
experience) and therefore results in the royalty structure having a similar impact as a revenue-based 
royalty regime, like that found in the United States and some other jurisdictions. In other words, 
while Alberta’s new system is argued to be a revenue-over-cost model, each firm’s cost is irrelevant 
to the determination of the royalty payment (the only firm-specific variable is well depth). While 
total royalty collections are expected to remain unchanged, the marginal royalty rate on production 
25 
The royalty rates in Figure 1 correspond to a well producing 50 barrels of oil per day, but the results are similar for other 
production levels. The royalty rates under the existing regime equal or exceed those under the new regime whenever the oil 
price is above US$26 per barrel at the exchange rate of 77 U.S. cents per Canadian dollar, or the well productivity is above 
49 barrels per day. 
8in excess of the cost allowance is reduced under the new scheme, resulting in a lower METRR as 
will be shown below for 2017. 
The new Alberta royalty regime therefore generally improves the competitiveness of the industry 
by lowering royalty rates after the cost allowance is used up. The cost allowance based on industry 
data, the elimination of drilling incentives and the consolidation of rates is simpler and less 
distorting across well types. The two new incentive programs discussed above will further help 
projects with recovery costs and new development. As noted by the panel, any cost efficiencies 
achieved by producers will result in higher profits without increasing royalty payments. This could 
encourage innovation as well. 
On the other hand, wells with above-average costs will have an inadequate cost allowance and will 
therefore have lower rents than wells with below-average costs. Given that the same royalty will be 
paid (all else being equal), lower-rent projects will pay more royalties as a share of rent compared 
to high-rent projects. Otherwise, only a resource levy based on an actual firm’s revenues and costs 
would avoid differences in effective tax rates on rents across well types. 
RESULTS
Taking into account the various corporate income tax provisions and royalties and the sales tax on 
capital purchases, tables 1 and 2 below provide the METRR results for each jurisdiction. 
As shown below in Table 1, Alberta conventional oil currently bears an METRR of 35.0 per 
cent,26 sharply reduced by the new royalty regime to 26.7 per cent.27 While Alberta has one of the 
highest METRRs for conventional oil investments in 2016 among the jurisdictions in the study, 
the new royalty regime will reduce the effective tax and royalty burden on investment below all 
other jurisdictions except for Australia, the United Kingdom, Pennsylvania and the two Atlantic 
provinces. 
Overall, conventional oil in most of the jurisdictions are subject to well-by-well revenue-based 
royalties that result in relatively high METRRs. A royalty based on production revenues paid on a 
well-by-well basis without an explicit deduction for costs raises the cost of undertaking investments 
in marginal projects, which earn no rent (a true rent-based royalty would be zero for marginal 
investments since revenues just cover the economic costs of production). Thus, for marginal 
projects that earn no rent, the Alberta conventional royalty reduces the return on investment and 
therefore discourages investments in marginal projects.
On the other hand, the oilsands royalty system, for which METRR is 29.3 per cent (Table 1), 
generally applies to rents by allowing a deduction for costs. It therefore discourages investment in 
the oilsands to a lesser extent compared to the current regime for conventional oil in Alberta, but 
will be a higher tax burden on capital compared to conventional oil under the new regime in 2017. 
Oilsands investment bears a relatively high METRR since the rent-based royalty interacts with the 
burden of the corporate income tax on marginal investments. When no corporate income taxes are 
paid, the royalty burden is small at only 0.3 per cent (Table 2, column C). A rent-based royalty in 
the absence of corporate income taxes typically yields an METRR of zero. The small but positive 
26 
For a well producing 50 barrels of oil per day, our benchmark case.
27 
The Alberta corporate tax rate increase from 10 to 12 per cent in 2015 raised the METRR from 34.3 to 35 per cent for 
conventional oil, while the new royalty regime reduces it to 26.7 per cent.
9METRR for oilsands in the absence of the corporate income tax reflects the payment of a revenue-
based royalty before costs are fully deducted from accumulated net revenues.28
TABLE 1 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATE BY JURISDICTION (IN PER CENT), 2016
  Exploration Development Depreciable Inventory Aggregate
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Canada* 13.8 18.8 31.7 30.8 27.7
British Columbia* 24.3 28.1 32.9 25.7 28.7
Alberta          
Conventional** (2016) 38.5 41.7 25.3 26.6 35.0
Conventional** (2017) 25.2 29.1 25.3 26.6 26.7
Oilsands -1.0 5.5 34.5 34.6 29.3
Saskatchewan** 28.4 32.2 36.7 27.9 32.6
Newfoundland & Labrador -2.9 3.8 50.1 N/A 11.8
Nova Scotia -6.1 -18.8 36.4 N/A -3.5
U.S. 36.3 37.1 35.5 24.6 36.1
Arkansas 23.8 24.9 39.3 27.1 29.5
Colorado 28.4 29.4 36.5 26.1 31.5
North Dakota 35.7 36.6 35.4 25.9 35.7
Pennsylvania 18.8 20.0 38.0 29.1 25.9
Texas 37.4 38.2 35.4 23.9 36.7
Australia -146.3 3.2 17.6 N/A -35.5
Norway -3.7 30.1 82.9 N/A 31.9
United Kingdom -2.5 -1.5 -4.8 N/A -2.5
Source: Authors’ calculations.
*  Canada average METRR reflects the new royalty regime in Alberta (2017). With the existing Alberta royalty regime, the 
Canada-wide METRR would be 30.9 per cent.
**  The royalty rates, and hence the marginal effective tax rates, for British Columbia, Alberta conventional oil and 
Saskatchewan are contingent on well productivity. In this table, we assume a well producing 50 barrels of oil per day 
for all three provinces. For a lower-productivity well with an output of 30 barrels per day, the aggregate METRR would 
be 23.3 per cent in British Columbia, 28.2 per cent in Alberta under the current regime and 21.3 per cent under the 
modernized regime, and 27.1 per cent in Saskatchewan. For a higher-productivity well with an output of 80 barrels per 
day, the METRRs would increase to 31.7 per cent in British Columbia, 40.6 per cent in Alberta under the current regime 
and 26.7 per cent under the modernized regime, and 35.7 per cent in Saskatchewan. One of the recommendations of 
Alberta’s royalty review panel was indeed to flatten the royalty rate schedule across different-sized wells.
28 
Intuitively, a rent-based royalty shares profits and risks with investors, but does not share the corporate tax burden. See J. 
Mintz, “Taxes, Royalties and Cross-Border Investments,” in International Taxation and the Extractive Industries, ed. P. 
Daniel et al. (Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund, Routledge, forthcoming 2016).
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TABLE 2 DECOMPOSING THE METRR ON NEW INVESTMENT (IN PER CENT), 2016
  All Levies Taxes Only Royalty Levies Only
  (A) (B) (C)
Canada* 27.7 15.0 9.9
British Columbia 28.7 11.9 16.8
Alberta      
Conventional (2016) 35.0 9.4 25.8
Conventional (2017) 26.7 9.4 17.4
Oilsands 29.3 22.3 0.3
Saskatchewan 32.6 14.3 18.7
Newfoundland & Labrador 11.8 4.8 0.0
Nova Scotia -3.5 7.3 -14.2
U.S. 36.1 14.8 22.1
Arkansas 29.5 16.5 13.6
Colorado 31.5 15.4 16.7
North Dakota 35.7 15.0 21.6
Pennsylvania 25.9 16.3 10.0
Texas 36.7 14.7 22.9
Australia -35.5 15.0 -73.4
Norway 31.9 4.2 21.8
United Kingdom -2.5 -3.7 0.5
Source: Authors’ calculations.
*  Canada average METRRs reflect the new royalty regime in Alberta (2017). With the existing Alberta royalty regime, the 
Canada-wide METRR equals 30.9 per cent for the “All Levies” case, 15.0 per cent for the “Taxes Only” case, and 13.1 per 
cent for the “Royalty Levies Only” case.
For Saskatchewan and British Columbia, conventional oil investments are discouraged somewhat 
more than in Alberta due to other taxes levied on investments (see Table 2). Even though 
Saskatchewan has the same corporate income tax rate as Alberta, Saskatchewan imposes a capital 
tax on resource firms, including oil firms, and a five per cent retail sales tax on capital purchases, 
offsetting some of the advantage of lower royalty payments. British Columbia has a lower corporate 
income tax than Alberta and Saskatchewan, however it applies a seven per cent provincial retail 
sales tax on certain capital purchases, which has a substantial impact on the METRR. 
Despite its high federal-provincial corporate income tax rate (31 per cent) and net royalty rate (up to 
35 per cent, which is deductible from the corporate income tax), Nova Scotia has the most generous 
royalty system for oil projects in Canada, with significant write-offs provided for expenditures on 
exploration and development under the royalty base due to high carry-forward interest rates for 
unused deductions. 
Newfoundland & Labrador has a lower corporate income tax rate than Nova Scotia but its new 
generic royalty regime does not provide the same preferences, especially for development and 
exploration expenditures. Both Atlantic offshore regimes discourage capital investment less than 
the western provinces, with lower aggregate METRRs. 
As for other jurisdictions, the U.S. is particularly uncompetitive with its federal-state corporate 
income tax rate ranging from 33 per cent to almost 40 per cent, compared to 26 per cent in 
British Columbia and 27 per cent in Alberta and Saskatchewan. It also taxes retail sales on capital 
purchases at slightly higher rates compared to Saskatchewan and British Columbia. 
11
Canada’s METRR is higher than Australia’s, where the latter’s profit-based tax on oil projects 
provides excessively high deductions and tax credits for exploration and development expenditures. 
On the other hand, Norway imposes the highest METRR on offshore oil projects due to its high 
corporate income and supplementary tax rates that add up to 78 per cent (the supplementary tax 
is an additional tax that is not deductible from the corporate income tax base). Although capital 
expenditures are expensed under the Norwegian supplementary tax (unused expenditures are 
carried forward for a limited period), the combined measures impose a significant disincentive to 
earn profits in Norway, given its high statutory corporate income tax rate and resource tax rate on 
income.
This is quite different than U.K. offshore investment. While the U.K. is reducing its corporate 
income tax to as low as 17 per cent by 2020, it is maintaining it at 30 per cent for ring-fenced oil 
and gas projects. With its supplementary rate substantially reduced from 32 to 10 per cent (the 
supplementary tax is not deductible from the corporate income tax base), the combined statutory 
tax rate was only 50 per cent in 2015 and 40 per cent in 2016, much lower than in Norway. As much 
of capital is expensed under the supplementary tax, the METRR on marginal projects is negative at 
-2.5 per cent, meaning that the fiscal system for offshore extraction actually encourages investment.
Overall, oil investments in Alberta are taxed more heavily than they are for the Atlantic offshore, 
Australia and the U.K., but less than in Arkansas, Colorado, North Dakota, Norway and Texas. 
Alberta conventional oil is less heavily taxed than similar investments in Saskatchewan and British 
Columbia due to the absence of a retail sales tax in Alberta and the more competitive royalty 
regime beginning in 2017. 
Most jurisdictions provide incentives for exploration and development for profit-based royalties 
(oilsands in Alberta and offshore oil in Atlantic Canada, Australia, Norway and the U.K.), resulting 
in much lower METRRs for exploration and development activities compared to post-production 
depreciable capital, which tends to distort the capital allocation decision towards relatively more 
investment in the development phase. However, under the conventional oil royalty in Alberta and 
other jurisdictions such as British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the United States, the overall fiscal 
system is more neutral across different assets and therefore is less distortive of investment decisions 
across assets in the oil sector. On the other hand, the Atlantic offshore and U.K. systems have 
aggregate METRRs closer to zero, thereby having less impact on aggregate investment decisions.
It is important to remember that these results are derived assuming a WTI price of US$50 per 
barrel and an exchange rate of 77 U.S. cents per Canadian dollar. However, the price of oil has 
dipped below US$30 per barrel more than once since the beginning of 2016. On the other hand, the 
oil price reaching US$70 per barrel in the future is not inconceivable. 
When the price of oil rises, there are two possible effects on METRR that work against each other. 
On one hand, for all jurisdictions that apply royalties to gross revenues, a higher oil price relative 
to operating costs increases the profit margin. This tends to reduce the marginal effective tax rate 
on new investment since the effective royalty payment declines as a share of the price-cost margin. 
We will call this the direct price effect. In our paper, this applies to British Columbia, Alberta and 
Saskatchewan and all U.S. states. 
In addition to this direct effect though, there is a second effect of the price of oil on the METRR 
that works in the opposite direction, which is relevant to Alberta and Saskatchewan. In these 
provinces, royalty rates are price dependent, with the government collecting a higher share of 
revenues when the price of oil rises. This tends to increase the METRR in these provinces as the 
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oil price increases.29 We will call this the royalty effect on METRR. The royalty rate applied to net 
revenues from Alberta oilsands also increases with the oil price, with a lower bound of 25 per cent 
when the WTI is US$55 or less. Overall, it is not immediately clear which of the two effects of the 
oil price on METRR would dominate in Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
Table 3 below reports the METRR under various price scenarios for WTI, ranging from a low of 
US$30 to a high of US$70.30 As expected, due to the direct price effect, the METRRs decline as the 
price of oil rises in British Columbia and the U.S. states, given that royalty rates are independent 
of price. In Alberta, the royalty effect dominates the direct price effect, and the METRR rises with 
the price of oil, albeit less so under the new royalty framework. At a price of oil of US$70 dollars, 
investment in conventional oil in Alberta would be particularly hard hit, with an METRR of more 
than 38 per cent under the existing framework, the highest of all jurisdictions.31 In Saskatchewan, 
the two effects of the price of oil on the METRR almost cancel each other out, and the METRR 
remains remarkably flat as the price of oil more than doubles from US$30 to US$70 per barrel.
TABLE 3 THE PRICE SENSITIVITY OF METRR ON NEW INVESTMENT (IN PER CENT), 2016
WTI Price (US$/barrel) 30 40 50 60 70
British Columbia 31.3 29.1 28.0 27.4 27.0
Alberta
Conventional (2016) 24.3 29.4 34.4 36.5 38.3
Conventional (2017) 19.0 22.5 26.3 28.1 29.9
Oilsands N/A 28.7 29.3 30.2 31.2
Saskatchewan 32.7 32.8 32.8 32.8 32.9
U.S. 40.3 37.5 36.1 35.2 34.7
Arkansas 32.1 30.3 29.5 28.9 28.6
Colorado 34.7 32.5 31.5 30.8 30.4
North Dakota 39.9 37.1 35.7 34.9 34.3
Pennsylvania 27.8 26.6 25.9 25.5 25.3
Texas 41.2 38.2 36.7 35.9 35.3
Source: Authors’ calculations.
A decrease in operating costs would work similar to an increase in the oil price, by increasing 
the profit margin and therefore decreasing METRR. Unlike the price, though, no jurisdiction 
in Table 3 ties its royalty rates to firm-specific operating costs, and therefore there is no other 
effect on METRR. Table 4 below illustrates the effect of changes in operating costs on METRR 
29 
This effect is partially mitigated by the fluctuations in the exchange rate between the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dollar. 
Royalty rates in Alberta and Saskatchewan depend on the price of oil expressed in Canadian dollars. As the WTI oil 
price rises, the Canadian dollar tends to appreciate (see for example Lananh Nguyen and Rachel Evans, “Commodity-
Exporter Currencies Advance as Crude Oil Prices Surge,” Bloomberg, May 16, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-05-16/commodity-exporter-currencies-advance-as-crude-oil-prices-surge ). Therefore the increase in the 
price of oil is less pronounced when expressed in Canadian dollars, and with it the increase in royalty rates. Similarly, the 
decrease in the price of oil of the last year has automatically resulted in lower royalty rates in these two provinces, but the 
decrease in royalty rates has been less dramatic due to the depreciation of the Canadian dollar.
30 
The METRR results for United States in Table 1 are derived assuming an operating cost of US$10 per barrel and a price 
of US$50, thus a profit margin of 80 per cent. For Canada, we have used the actual profit margins in British Columbia (77 
per cent), Alberta (78 per cent) and Saskatchewan (81 per cent) based on historical data on revenues and costs. In Table 
3, however, we assume the same operating cost of US$10 per barrel in all jurisdictions and focus on the effect of oil price 
fluctuations. Hence, the results in Table 3 for a price of oil of US$50 are identical to the aggregate METRR results reported 
in Table 1 for the U.S. states, but not for the Canadian provinces.
31 
We ignore the likely appreciation or depreciation of the Canadian dollar that may accompany an increase or decrease in oil 
prices, which will dampen shifts in royalty rates and METRR in both Alberta and Saskatchewan, as explained in footnote 
22 above.
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in the jurisdictions that employ gross royalties, with the price fixed at US$50 per barrel.32 For all 
jurisdictions, the METRR increases with the operating cost. The increase is least significant for 
the oilsands in Alberta, since the gross royalty rate applies only in the pre-payout phase of oilsands 
projects.
TABLE 4 COST SENSITIVITY OF METRR ON NEW INVESTMENT (IN PER CENT), 2016
 Change in Operating Costs -20% -10% 0% +10% +20%
British Columbia 27.3 27.6 28.0 28.4 28.9
Alberta
Conventional (2016) 33.2 33.8 34.4 35.0 35.7
Conventional (2017) 25.5 25.9 26.3 26.7 27.2
Oilsands 29.2 29.2 29.3 29.3 29.4
Saskatchewan 31.9 32.4 32.8 33.3 33.8
U.S. 35.1 35.6 36.1 36.6 37.2
Arkansas 28.8 29.1 29.5 29.8 30.1
Colorado 30.7 31.1 31.5 31.9 32.3
North Dakota 34.7 35.2 35.7 36.2 36.8
Pennsylvania 25.5 25.7 25.9 26.2 26.4
Texas 35.7 36.2 36.7 37.3 37.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.
CONCLUSIONS
At existing oil prices, we show that Alberta’s new fiscal regime for conventional oil is more 
competitive in attracting investment compared to the 2016 regime. While it is not badly out of line 
or better than most jurisdictions in this study, it is still less competitive than regimes in Australia, 
the U.K. and Pennsylvania, as well as Nova Scotia and Newfoundland & Labrador. At higher oil 
prices (US$70 WTI), the price-sensitive conventional royalty, unlike that of the U.S., will result 
in higher effective tax rates on new investments compared to British Columbia, Arkansas and 
Pennsylvania, but below that of Saskatchewan, Colorado, North Dakota and Texas.
We also find that Saskatchewan and British Columbian oil investments are disadvantaged, not 
so much due to their royalty structure, but as a result of their retail sales taxes, which result in 
the taxation of capital purchases and, in the case of Saskatchewan, a capital tax paid by resource 
companies.
We further note that the new generic royalty developed by Newfoundland & Labrador is simpler 
and less distortionary compared to its previous royalty regime. 
32 
As in Table 3, and as explained in footnote 29 above, for this exercise we use the same benchmark operating cost for 
conventional oil of US$10 per barrel in all jurisdictions. As a result, the figures reported for British Columbia, Alberta 
and Saskatchewan are slightly different than those reported in Table 1, where we use historic data for the profit margins in 
these three jurisdictions. For oilsands, we use a benchmark operating cost of US$21.40 per barrel for steam-assisted gravity 
drainage and US$20.50 per barrel for mining operations.
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APPENDIX
PARAMETERS USED IN THE METRR CALCULATIONS
TABLE A1 TAX PARAMETERS BY JURISDICTION, 2016
Canada British Columbia Alberta Saskatchewan Newfoundland  and Labrador Nova Scotia
Corporate income tax 26% 27% 27% 30% 31%
Federal CIT 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Provincial CIT 11% 12% 12% 15% 16%
Effective sales tax rate on 
depreciable capital 1.8% N/A 0.9% N/A N/A
Revenue-based royalty 0-30%*(varying with output)
0-40%
(varying with oil price 
and output)
varying with oil price 
and output** N/A N/A
Rent-based (net) royalty N/A 25%-40%(varying with oil price) N/A 50%***
2-tier
20%/35% 
No uplift / return allowance for income taxes
Uplift for exploration N/A LTBR N/A N/A
2-tier
20%+LTBR/ 
45%+LTBR
Uplift for development N/A LTBR N/A N/A
2-tier
20%+LTBR/ 
45%+LTBR
Uplift for depreciable capital N/A LTBR N/A N/A
2-tier
20%+LTBR/ 
45%+LTBR
* New oil.
** Fourth-tier non-heavy oil.
*** R-factor above three.
 U.S. Arkansas Colorado North Dakota Pennsylvania Texas
Combined corporate income tax
U=Uf(1-Us)+Us
37.26% 36.01% 35.79% 39.60% 33.40%
Federal CIT (Uf) 32.90% 32.90% 32.90% 32.90% 32.90%
State CIT (Us) 6.50% 4.63% 4.31% 9.99% 0.75%
Effective sales tax rate on 
depreciable capital 2.6% 2.1% 1.8% 1.8% 2.3%
Revenue-based royalty* 12.50% 16.67% 18.75% 12.50% 25.01%**
Rent-based (net) royalty N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Severance tax 5.00% 5.00% 10.00% 0.00% 4.60%
Effective royalty rate*** 21.09% 26.04% 33.59% 15.63% 35.58%
No uplift/return allowance of any kind
*  Royalty due on state-owned land.
**  Includes the franchise tax.
***  Combined royalty and severance tax, taking into account the partial offsetting mechanism between the two.
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Other Countries Australia Norway U.K.
Combined corporate income tax 30% 78% 40%
Corporate income tax 30% 27% 30%
Supplementary / special tax on oil
(Sharing the CIT base)
N/A 51% 10%
Revenue-based royalty N/A N/A N/A
Rent-based (net) royalty 40% N/A N/A
Uplift under corporate income tax
Exploration N/A N/A* 10%
Development N/A N/A 10%
Depreciable capital N/A N/A N/A
Uplift under supplementary tax
Exploration N/A N/A* 10%
Development N/A 5.5%, 4 years 10%
Depreciable capital N/A 5.5%, 4 years N/A
Uplift under rent tax
Exploration LTBR + 15% N/A N/A
Development LTBR + 5% N/A N/A
Depreciable capital LTBR + 5% N/A N/A
* Exploration costs in Norway are expensed and the tax value of exploration expenses refunded for each year of tax loss.
TABLE A2 NON-TAX PARAMETERS BY JURISDICTION, 2016
Canada Australia Canada Norway U.K. U.S.
Inflation rate* 1.81% 1.92% 3.88% 1.20% 1.97%
Real interest rate 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Nominal interest rate 4.81% 4.92% 6.88% 4.20% 4.97%
Long-term bond rate** 2.5% 1% N/A N/A N/A
* Ten-year average GDP deflator inflation rates based on OECD data (2004–2014).
** Trading Economics, 10-year government bond rate Feb. 2016.
TABLE A3 COMMON PARAMETERS FOR ALL JURISDICTIONS, 2016
Debt-to-asset ratio 40%
Average time to build — exploration 5 years
Average time to build — development* 3 years
Time from making investment to payout — exploration 10 years
Time from making investment to payout — development 8 years
*  Except for Newfoundland & Labrador, where we assume it takes 10 years for a project to reach an R-factor of three or 
more.
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TABLE A4 CAPITAL WEIGHTS BY PROJECT TYPE, 2016
Conventional Oilsands Offshore
Exploration 26.7% 2.4% 28.0%
Development 37.6% 15.2% 50.6%
Depreciable assets 33.3% 79.9% 21.4%
Inventory 2.4% 2.5% 0.0%
Aggregate 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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